Interpreting others' actions in a correct way is fundamental for healthy and successful social relationships. In daily life, subjects often face a social dilemma in two stages. In Stage 1, they recognize the social dilemma structure of the decision problem at hand (a tension between personal interest and collective interest); in Stage 2, they have to choose between gathering additional information to learn the exact payoffs corresponding to each of the two options or making a choice without looking at the payoffs. Previous theoretical research suggests that the mere act of considering one's strategic options in a social dilemma will be met with distrust. Here we report a large experiment conducted to test this assumption. Subjects were randomly divided between decision makers and observers. Decision makers were presented with two options: Option A would give the same payoff to both the decision maker and an anonymous observer; Option B would maximize decision maker's payoff, at the expense of the observer. Before making their choice, decision makers were offered the possibility to learn the exact payoffs corresponding to each of the two options. Observers were incentivized to report their correct beliefs about the choice that decision makers would make conditional on whether they decided to learn or not the exact payoff structure of the game. Baseline conditions were also conducted for comparative analysis. Interestingly, we have found a strong bias according to which subjects who decide to look at payoffs are perceived to be much more selfish than they actually are. This bias is not due to an underlying bias regarding the level of pro-sociality in others, since we have also found that beliefs match actual actions in all the baseline conditions.
Introduction
Imagine being in a bar with your significant other. You leave for the restroom and, when you return, you find out that your partner has stricken up a conversation with an attractive stranger. While you walk back to the bar, you try to smile and pretend that everything is fine. However, it is quite likely that you are actually annoyed by your partner's behavior. Why? What does your partner's behavior signal? Are you interpreting your partner's behavior in the correct way? Social relationships are based on the interpretation of others' actions. As such, correct interpretations are invaluable to successful interactions. Thus, since situations similar to the one just described are common in everyday interactions, it is important to understand whether people's behavior in these situations is correctly interpreted. From a formal point of view, this type of situation can be formalized by a two-stage strategic game with one decision maker and one observer (see Figure 1) . In Stage 2, the decision maker (i.e., your partner) has to choose between cooperate and defect. In our example, cooperation corresponds to continuing their relationship with you, while defecting corresponds to breaking their relationship with you and starting one with someone else (i.e., the stranger in the bar). Cooperation gives a payoff dc to the decision maker and a payoff oc = dc to the observer (i.e., you), while defection gives a payoff pd > pc to the decision maker and od < oc to the observer. However, before talking to the stranger, your partner does not know the exact payoffs involved. Thus, the decision maker has actually two decisions to make: in Stage 1, before deciding whether to cooperate or not, the decision maker has to decide between looking at the payoffs (i.e., talking to the stranger) or not (i.e., not talking to the stranger). This strategic situation is similar to the envelope game introduced for iterated interactions by Hoffman, Yoeli and Nowak (2015) and for one-shot games by Hilbe, Hoffman and Nowak (2015) . These theoretical studies posit that "the mere act of considering one's strategic options and gathering information about the possible costs and benefits of an action will be met with distrust" (Hilbe, Hoffman & Nowak, 2015) . However, to the best of our knowledge, no experimental studies have been conducted to test this hypothesis. Indirect support for this assumption comes from the so-called Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH). Introduced by Rand and colleagues (Rand, Greene & Nowak 2012; ), the SHH maintains that people internalize strategies that are successful in their everyday interactions and tend to use these heuristics as default strategies when they encounter a new and atypical situation that resembles a situation they have encountered in the past. Then, after additional deliberation, people may overcome these heuristics and adjust their behavior towards the one that is optimal in a given situation. Since, in our envelope game, gathering information about the exact payoff structure of the game is a signal of deliberation, in line with the theoretical work by Hoffman, Yoeli and Nowak (2015) and by Hilbe, Hoffman and Nowak (2015) , the SHH predicts that subjects who look at the payoffs should be more selfish than those to whom payoffs are given by the experimenter. Coming back to our initial example, from this point of view, you may be annoyed with your partner, because you interpret his or her behavior as a signal of selfish attitudes. However, two fundamental questions remain unsolved: Does looking at payoffs really signal selfish behavior? If so, does looking at payoffs truly predict selfish tendencies? To answer these questions, we measured actual decision makers' behavior and elicited observers' beliefs in a behavioral experiment using an envelope game in the spirit of Figure 1 , but in three different experimental conditions. In the optional information treatment, decision makers play the exact game displayed in Figure 1 , in which precise payoffs corresponding to cooperation and defection are initially not given, but subjects are given the possibility to learn them; in the open information treatment, decision makers play a variant of the game in Figure  1 in which the exact payoffs are given by the experimenters; in the no information treatment, decision makers play a variant of the game in Figure 1 in which precise payoffs are not given and, moreover, subjects are not given the possibility to learn them. These last two treatments serve as baseline conditions. For each of these three treatments, observers were incentivized to guess decision makers' behavior. Of course, in the optional information treatment, there are two types of receivers: those who have been paired with a decision maker who decided to look at the payoffs, and those who have been paired with a decision maker who decided not to look at the payoffs. We refer the reader to the Methods section for more details about the experimental design and to the Results section for the description of the results. Here we anticipate that we have found evidence of three major findings: (i) observers believe that decision makers who choose to look at payoffs are significantly more selfish than those to whom payoffs are given by the experimenter; (ii) decision makers who look at payoffs are not significantly more selfish than those to whom payoffs are given; (iii) observers have correct beliefs of decision makers' behavior in all other conditions. These results suggest that looking at the payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does not actually mean so. Moreover, this bias is not driven by a general bias towards the amount of altruism in others.
Experiment
As mentioned earlier, we aim to (i) measure a possible change in observers' beliefs caused by knowing that the decision maker has decided to look at the payoffs of a social dilemma before making their decision, and (ii) measure whether a possible change in observers' beliefs correspond to a change in decision makers' actual behavior.
Method
Subjects were living in the US at the time of the experiment and were recruited using the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010; Horton, Rand & Zeckhauser 2011). Each of 1088 participants (57% males, mean age=32) was randomly assigned to one of seven conditions and passed standard comprehension questions to make sure they have understood the decision problem at hand. Any subjects that did not pass the comprehension questions were automatically excluded from the survey. The proportion of subjects who did not pass the comprehension questions was 35%, which is in line with previous studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk using social dilemmas (Capraro, Jordan & Rand, 2014) . The seven experimental conditions were as follows. Received. Here all participants were decision makers, to whom we asked to decide between Option A and Option B. Option A would give 20c to both themselves and the person they were paired with (participating in the Guess Received condition described below). Option B would give 30c to themselves and 10c to the other person. Denied. This condition was similar to the Received condition, but decision makers (paired with participants in the Guess Denied condition) were not told the payoffs corresponding to the two options. Moreover, participants were not given the choice to learn them. The only information they had was that Option A would be the fair option and that Option B would favor themselves at the expenses of the other person. Choose. This condition was similar to the Denied condition. Participants were told that Option A would be the fair option, but Option B would maximize their payoff at the expenses of the other participant. After giving this piece of information, we asked participant whether they wanted to know the exact amounts of money corresponding to each of the two options. Depending on their choice these participants were paired with observers in the Guess Chose Yes and Guess Chose No conditions. Guess Received. Each participant was grouped together with other two participants, named Person 1 and Person 2, who are playing the same game (Person 1 in the role of the decision maker and Person 2 a fictive participant in the role of the receiver). Participants were shown the screenshots of the instructions presented to Person 1 (participating in the Received condition) and had to guess Person 1's decision. Correct guesses were incentivized with a $0.20 prize. We opted for measuring beliefs from the point of view of a third party, instead from the point of view of the receiver, because a risk-averse receiver has an incentive not to report their correct beliefs, even if they are incentivized. For example, a risk-averse receiver who believes that the decision maker is going to choose Option A with probability 0.5 and Option B with probability 0.5 would prefer to bet on Option B rather than Option A, because the two bets have the same expected value (20c), but betting on Option B has an higher certain reward. We refer to d'Adda, Capraro and Tavoni (2015) and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) for related discussions. Guess Denied. This condition was similar to the Guess Received condition, but participants were shown screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers participating in the Denied condition. Guess Chose Yes. This condition was similar to the previous ones, but participants were shown the screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers participating in the Choose condition, who decided to look at payoffs. Observers were communicated also the payoff structure of the game, and not only that the decision maker decided to look at the payoffs. Guess Chose No. This condition was similar to the previous ones, but participants were shown the screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers participating in the Choose condition, who decided not to look at payoffs. After the decision was made, participants were asked to fill a basic demographic questionnaire. Together with usual questions (sex, age, and level of education), we also asked participants to self-report the extent to which they have already participated in games involving giving money to an anonymous stranger. Asking this question is crucial in research potentially interacting with the SHH, since participants' level of experience is a well-known moderator of the SHH Capraro & Cococcioni, 2015) . Indeed, the SHH regards behavioral differences between people using heuristics learned in everyday interactions and people deliberating about the particular situation they are facing in that moment. Consequently, any predicted difference would be driven by naïve subjects, since experienced subjects may have had time to override their heuristics and adjust their behavior towards the one that is optimal in the given situation. As in previous studies (Rand et 
Anonymity was preserved all along the experiment and the analysis of the data. Figure 2 provides visual evidence of our main results. Apart from the condition in which decision makers were given the choice to look at the payoffs and decided to do so, observers' beliefs about decision makers' behavior look very accurate. The only bias seems to regard the condition in which decision makers decided to look at the payoffs. The figure suggests that looking at payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does not actually mean so. To confirm this, we now report formal statistical analysis. Ordinary least squares analysis shows that in the cases of denied payoffs, received payoffs and choosing not to know the payoffs, there is no statistically significant difference between the choices of decision makers and observers' beliefs (all p's > 0.4). Hence the beliefs about the actions of Player 1 are not significantly different from their actual actions. This does not change after controlling for sex, age and level of education (all p's > 0.3). However, results differ when the decision maker chooses to know the payoffs. Specifically, there is a strong statistically significant difference between the decisions of the participants acting as Player 1 and observers' predictions of their choices (coeff = 0.23, p < .0001), which remains significant after controlling for sex, age and level of education (p < .0001). The effect size is also extremely large (about 23%). Taken together, these results provide evidence for a strong bias according to which subjects looking at the payoffs are perceived much more selfish than they actually are, and this bias is not due to an underlying bias regarding the amount of altruism in others. Next we examine whether this bias is driven by Player 1's actual altruism or beliefs about Player 1's altruism, or both. To do so, we pool together the data of the Guess Received condition and the Guess Chose Yes condition and we conduct linear regression predicting observers' beliefs as a function of a dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the subject participated in the Guess Received condition, and 0 otherwise. Results show that observers' significantly underestimate decision makers' altruism (coeff = −0.123, p = 0.032). This correlation becomes even stronger when controlling for sex, age, and level of education (coeff = -0.132, p = 0.022). Similarly, we pool together the data of the Received condition and those of the participants in the Choose condition, who decided to look at the payoffs. Linear regression shows that participants who looked at the payoffs tend to be more altruist, but not significantly so (coeff = 0.06, p = 0.27). This is robust after controlling for sex, age, and education (coeff = 0.06, p = 0.26). These results provide evidence that the aforementioned bias regarding the level of altruism of subjects who decide to look at the payoffs is mainly driven by a bias in observers' beliefs about decision makers' level of altruism. Then, we investigate whether not looking at payoffs signals altruistic behavior. Similar analysis as before shows that these people are neither more altruist (p = 0.46) nor perceived to be more altruist (p = 0.99) than the baseline. However, we mention that the proportion of people who decided not to look at payoffs was so small (around 10%), that it is possible that the lack of a significant effect is due to an undesired ceiling effect. As mentioned in the Introduction, since looking at the payoffs is a signal of deliberation, the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) predicts that people who look at the payoffs should be more selfish than those to whom payoffs are given. This is not what we have found and, if anything, our results seem to be pointing to the opposite direction. However, a closer look at the data shows that this apparently contradictory finding is an artifact of the fact that the majority (85%) of our experimental subjects reported having previous experience in experiments involving giving money to an anonymous stranger. The SHH indeed predicts that only naïve subjects bring strategies learned in everyday interactions to the laboratory, since experienced subjects have had time to override their heuristics and adjust their behavior towards the one that is optimal in the given situation. As such, the SHH makes two distinct predictions: (i) naïve subjects to whom payoffs are given should be less selfish than non-naïve subjects to whom payoffs are given (because naïve subjects are more likely than experienced subjects to use cooperative heuristics learned in everyday interactions. See Rand et al. 2014 and Capraro et al. 2014 for a similar discussion); (ii) the proportion of selfish choices among people who look at the payoffs should be higher than the proportion of selfish choices among people to whom payoffs are given, but only among naïve subjects (because only among naïve subjects looking at the payoffs is a signal of deliberation). Figure 3 reports proportions of selfish choices among subjects who looked at the payoffs and those to whom payoffs are given, separated by participants' level of experience. 
Results and discussion

Figure 2. Proportions of selfish choices across conditions. Error bars denote the standard error of the means. The first, the second, and the fourth pair of columns provide visual evidence that observers' beliefs about decision makers' behavior match actual choices in all conditions, save the one in which decision makers decided to look at the payoffs before making their decision. Linear regression confirms this (all p's > 0.4). On the other hand, the third pair of columns shows that participants looking at the payoffs were perceived highly more selfish than they actually are. This is confirmed by linear regression (coeff = 0.23, p < .0001). This bias turns out to be driven by beliefs, rather than actual behavior. More precisely, participants looking at the payoffs were believed significantly more selfish than in the condition in which payoffs
16). The lack of statistical significance is partly due to the very small number of naïve subjects (15% of the total).
The figure provides evidence that results are indeed in line with the predictions of the SHH, although they are not statistically significant. Specifically, naïve subjects who decided to look at the payoffs tended to be less selfish than those to whom payoffs were given (43% vs 54%, coeff = 0.11, p = 0.46) and naïve subjects to whom payoffs were given tended to be less selfish than experienced subjects to whom payoffs were given (43% vs 59%, coeff = 0.15 , p = 0.16). The lack of significant effects is partly due to the very small number of naïve subjects (15% of the total). Thus, our results, consistently with the SHH, provide evidence that subjects looking at the payoffs may indeed be more selfish than the baseline. In light of this, it might be possible that the bias we have previously reported, according to which subjects who decide to look at the payoffs are perceived to be extremely more selfish than they actually are, is actually driven by the level of experience of participants. To exclude this, we restrict the analysis to naïve subjects who participated in the Guess Chose Yes condition and in the Choose condition, who decided to look at the payoffs. We find that the proportion of selfish guesses among naïve subjects in the Guess Chose Yes condition was 73.9% (compared with 73.8%, of the total sample), and the proportion of selfish choices among naïve subjects who decided to look at the payoffs was 54.5% (compared with 50.9%, of the total sample). Thus, even after controlling for level of experience, the effect size remains quantitatively similar to the one previously reported (20% vs 23%) and, moreover, statistically significant (p = 0.037). To summarize, our results provide evidence that subjects who look at the payoffs are perceived much more selfish than they actually are and that this effect is not driven by any possibly confounding factors, among the observable ones.
General discussion
Interpreting other people's actions in a correct way is a crucial ingredient for healthy and successful social relationships. The present findings report an interesting bias in the interpretation of an action in a situation that is likely to occur often in everyday interactions. In daily life, subjects often face social dilemmas in two stages. In Stage 1, they recognize the social dilemma structure of the decision problem (a tension between personal interest and collective interest); in Stage 2, they have to choose between gathering additional information to learn the exact payoffs corresponding to each of the two options or making a choice without looking at the payoffs. Recent models propose that looking at the payoffs will be met with distrust ( Our results confirm this assumption, by showing that observers believe that people who decide to look at the payoffs before making their decision are perceived to be significantly more selfish than the baseline. However, interestingly, our results also show that this happens to be a bias in the interpretation of decision makers' actions: subjects who look at the payoffs are not more selfish than the baseline. If anything, they are even slightly more altruist than the baseline, although the correlation is not significant (effect size = 7%, p = 0.27). This result may seem, at first sight, surprising, since it points to the opposite direction than predicted by the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (Rand et al. 2012; ). However, we have shown that this apparently contradictory finding is an artifact of the fact that most of our experimental subjects have reported previous experience with economic games involving giving money to an anonymous stranger. When we separate naïve subjects from experienced subjects, our results turns out to be in line with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis: (i) previous experience tends to increase selfish choices among subjects to whom payoffs are given, and (ii) naïve subjects who look at the payoffs tend to be more selfish than naïve subjects to whom payoffs are given. Yet, even after controlling for the level of experience, we find that subjects who decided to look at payoffs are believed to be much more selfish than they actually are. What is the origin of this bias? One potential explanation stems from the theory of moral selfconcept and moral cleansing proposed by Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin (2009). Their theory posits that people have a positive moral conception of themselves and that they strive for balance in their moral acts to maintain this positive concept. In other words, when people do something that they think it is morally wrong, they need to subsequently do something that they think it is morally right to compensate for it (Brañas-Garza, Bucheli, Paz Espinosa &
